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n India, economic liberalization arguably began in the early 1980s, 
when the Indira Gandhi government abandoned a spate of 
interventionist measures the country’s first Prime Minister, the Fabian 
socialist Jawaharlal Nehru, had championed, with the hope of taming markets 
and lessening inequality.  Through the 1980s, trade controls were relaxed, 
corporate taxes lowered, and markets partially deregulated.  This initial rupture 
with Nehruvian statism was completed, however, only in 1991, when a minority 
government, led by the historic Congress party, introduced a template of reform 
that echoed the audacious economic liberalism of the Washington Consensus 
model (for the specifics of these reforms, see Ahluwalia, 2006).  The policies 
generated by India’s “paradigm shift”1 of 1991 have proved enormously resilient, 
and have survived multiple changes in government (on this, see Nayar, 2000).  In 
the last, almost two decades, they have profoundly altered the country’s 
economic landscape.    
As in many other countries, market reform has hurt labour.  The losses 
for labour have been particularly immense in the (more patently neoliberal) post-
1991 period, with a painful withering away of the few, limited privileges it had 
earlier secured within the constraints of Indian capitalism.  Besides a more 
aggressively pro-capital state, organized labour has had to contend with an acute 
contraction of formal employment, which has run down its already-meagre 
numbers.  Labour has also been affected by another trend associated with the 
1990s, namely, the rise of religion and caste-based politics. While the growth of 
identity politics is an outcome of democratic expansion in India, and thus should 
not be viewed as an inherently negative development, it has served to weaken 
labour’s already-tenuous unity as a political movement.   
In response to the challenges of market reform and democratic expansion, 
many of India’s established, party-affiliated unions have altered their 
mobilizational strategies in novel ways.  In fact, viewed from this perspective, 
India’s rapid democratic expansion has actually helped labour, by churning out 
I
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new spaces and opportunities for political action, along with a fresh set of 
potential political allies.  For labour, the hope, though still unmet, is one of 
revitalization and renewed impact.  My essay explores the immediate factors that 
have contributed to labour’s precipitous decline, and probes the implications of 
labour’s emerging politics of revival.  It attempts, furthermore, to identify some 
of the new areas of concern that have emerged as a result of the perceptible shifts 
in labour’s outlook and strategizing.2   
 
II. MYTHS AND REALITIES 
 
Proponents of market reform usually disagree with the thesis that labour 
has suffered a loss of political power in the post-1991 period.  Many insist that 
crucial aspects of the liberalization agenda – such as privatization and civil 
service reform – have been derailed due to opposition from labour prosperity 
(see The Economist, 8 March, 2008, p. 11).  A great deal of ink is routinely spilled 
on the evident inability of reformist governments to repeal the Industrial 
Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947, which requires firms employing more than one 
hundred workers to obtain government permission before instituting layoffs and 
closures.  It is said that without an easy “exit policy” for firms, India will not 
attract the foreign direct investment it so sorely needs.   Opposition from labour 
is also said to have foiled the evolution of a more “flexible approach” to 
employment.  Market enthusiasts argue that this could be easily achieved 
through a reform of the Contract Labour (Abolition and Regulation) Act of 1970, 
which currently bans contract labour in all forms of work deemed “perennial.”  It 
is said that state-level governments in India – intimidated as they are by the 
country’s powerful party-affiliated trade unions – have interpreted the term too 
broadly, thus unreasonably restricting the use of contract labour.  All in all, 
labour is viewed, from this perspective, as a political actor with considerable 
privilege; one that is coddled by state governments, and protected by India’s 
generally pro-labour (and anti-business) legal-institutional framework.  
Yet many prominent social scientists and industrial relations specialists 
hold a different view (for two important pieces, see Jha, 2005, and Saini, 2007).  
They argue that Indian labour unions (or trade unions) have experienced a steep 
decline in their ability to influence public policies since the onset of liberalization 
in the 1980s.3  Pranab Bardhan (2003) has pointed out, for example, that the 
impressive range of laws and institutions that appears to protect labour in theory 
is largely subverted in practice, usually with the connivance of state-level 
governments and courts.  He suggests that, in many cases, the IDA’s restrictions 
on layoffs are undermined through the aggressive use of ‘Voluntary Retirement 
Schemes,’ which are often implemented alongside unreasonable freezes on 
recruitment.  Moreover, an increasing amount of work is being subcontracted to 
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small-scale units that are not covered by the IDA.  The Contract Labour Act is 
also being widely evaded, through cleverly designed job or task redefinition.   
The heavier use of lockouts is another means of shedding workers under 
the radar of the law (on this, see Sundar, 2003).  As indicated in Table 3, the 
proportion of strikes in the total number of industrial disputes has fallen quite 
dramatically in the last three decades, while the proportion of lockouts has risen, 
equally dramatically.  State-level studies indicate, moreover, that many lockouts 
are “indefinite,” in that they last several or more years, during which large 
numbers of workers migrate to neighbouring towns in search for work, or return 
permanently to their villages (see Datt, 2003, for a study of industrial disputes in 
West Bengal).  It merits notice that many of the lockouts in the West Bengal study 
were “pure lockouts,” in that they were not preceded by a strike, and were, in 
Datt’s view, imposed on largely unsubstantiated charges of “worker indiscipline 
and violence.” As Datt points out, this more intensive use of lockouts is a sign of 
management’s strength and assertiveness.   
Another indicator of management’s growing aggressiveness and power 
in relation to trade unions is that more and more firms have apparently 
succeeded in bypassing unions and collective bargaining structures altogether.  
In a firm, concerns around wages, benefits, job security and unreasonable 
production targets are usually raised by its party-affiliated unions.  Such unions 
– especially those allied with the different Communist parties – tend to prefer 
strategies of agitation in their quest to protect workers’ rights.  Not surprisingly, 
managers would rather not deal with them.  A standard practice developed by 
management to counter the more confrontational party-affiliated unions is to 
organize workers into plant-level “team-member” associations that focus on 
relatively non-political issues, such as the quality of canteen or transportation 
services.  These ad hoc associations then compete with the more-established, 
party-affiliated unions for workers’ attention and allegiance.   
Until recently, managers could ill-afford to ignore the party-affiliated 
unions on their shop floors.  Over the course of an industrial dispute, the 
relevant state-level government would insist that the firm’s management 
negotiate with its party-affiliated unions.  Now, however, managers reportedly 
disregard party-affiliated unions with impunity, justifying their actions with the 
argument that these unions are too “political” or, in any case, too “external” to 
their employees’ concerns (Roychowdhury, 2003).  Some managers have tried to 
circumvent unions altogether by pressing workers to sign individual contracts 
and pledges of “good behaviour” (these typically hinge on the promise of 
avoiding “political” activity) in return for a relatively higher-than-average wage.  
This trend is particularly strong in multinational companies, and in new 
“sunrise” industries such as information technology (IT) and business process 
outsourcing (BPO).  Strikingly, in a dispute over wages in Pepsi’s plant in 
Bangalore, the parents of employees were used to pressure their children into 
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signing “good behaviour” contracts.  In addition, workers that chose to join 
party-affiliated unions faced suspension and dismissal (Roychowdhury, 2005).   
The resort to such methods by management is hardly surprising.  What is 
surprising, however, is the government’s reluctance to intervene on side with 
labour, and to tolerate many clear violations of standard trade union practices.  
Regrettably, pitilessness towards unions now appears to be the norm.   Some 
state governments, such as in Tamil Nadu, have invoked state-level versions of 
the notorious Essential Services Maintenance Act to defeat strikes in industries 
declared “essential services” (unions have complained that such declarations are 
often made on arbitrary grounds, under pressure from business interests in the 
concerned sector).  Other state governments, like in West Bengal, have avoided 
open confrontation with labour, but have undermined unions nonetheless, by 
refusing timely interventions in industrial disputes.  Conflicts are allowed to 
drag out for months, even years, until a depleted workforce is forced to submit to 
the management’s demands (see Datt, 2003).  To make matters worse, courts at 
both state and national levels have tended to weigh in against labour (see 
Venkataratnam, 1998).  Most notable here is a judgment, rendered by the 
Supreme Court of India in 2003 that flatly prohibits strikes by government 
employees (see Datt, 2008).  
Ultimately, the litmus test of a country’s labour-power is the degree to 
which its corporate elites worry about their ability to successfully tackle 
industrial relations issues.  Instructive in this regard is one survey, carried out in 
the mid-1990s, which sought the views of private firms, both domestic and 
foreign, on what makes for an attractive business environment at the state-level.  
Here, interviewees ranked peaceful industrial relations well below factors such 
as power supply, raw material availability, and transportation facilities, 
suggesting that, contrary to the popular myth on the subject, trade union 
activism was not a deterring factor of sufficient import in the making of 
investment decisions (see Business World, 8-9 September, 1995).  The point was 
driven home all the more bluntly in 2003 by the patently pro-business India Today 
magazine: “The big and bulky of corporate India are boldly doing what nobody 
thought they could do: slash their workforce and transform themselves into 
leaner, meaner, flatter and more flexible organizations… ‘Downsizing’ is not 
longer a dirty word” (Saran, 2003, p. 38).    
   
III. THE STEPS TO DECLINE 
 
The hollowing out of the legal-institutional architecture designed to 
protect labour is not surprising, given the context of its development.  Soon after 
independence, the Indian National Congress – the organization that had 
spearheaded India’s decolonization struggle – tried to mobilize all sectors of 
society behind its leadership.  In its new incarnation as India’s ruling political 
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party, the Congress founded its own trade unions, student associations and 
peasant groups.  Its hope was to build support for the fledgling government’s 
social and economic programs (see Rudolph & Rudolph, 1987).  Designed to lack 
autonomy, these groups were stringently controlled by the Congress.  On their 
own, they were regarded with suspicion; as capable of disrupting the still-fragile 
social and political order.  Many scholars have pointed out that the enactment of 
labour legislation in India was borne out of the post-colonial state’s interest in 
maintaining industrial peace rather than out of any genuine concern for workers 
(see, for example, Amjad, 2001).   
This utilitarian and somewhat antagonistic view of labour was also the 
result of the Congress’s pre-independence alliance with the domestic business 
class, on whose material resources the organization had grown increasingly 
dependent (for a history of the Congress party’s relationship with the business 
class, see Bagchi, 1982).  Notably, this early bond between the Congress and the 
business class translated into crucial choices at the point of state formation, such 
as that of capitalism, liberal-democracy, and an industrial relations regime tilted 
heavily in favour of capital.  Proposals for profit sharing and co-determination, 
advanced by the Congress’s Left factions and the new government’s Labour 
Ministry, were swiftly dismissed by the party’s central command.  Labour policy 
was definitively subordinated to industrial policy by the Planning Commission 
and other economic ministries, which worried that the concessions to labour 
recommended by the Labour Ministry would translate into prohibitive costs for 
industrialists (for an overview of such struggles, see Chibber, 2005).   
In time, the Congress party’s paternalistic relationship with trade unions 
was reproduced by other political parties, which created their own labour wings, 
thus splintering an already anaemic labour movement into a gaggle of competing 
unions vying for the favour of government and management.  As Rudolph & 
Rudolph (1987, pp. 276-77) point out, the state “created a legal and procedural 
environment that induce[d] unions to depend on government and management 
more than on their membership for recognition as bargaining agents and in 
dispute settlement,” and, in fact, facilitated the multiplication of bargaining 
agents in the same enterprise, a situation in which management or government 
could easily exploit inter-union rivalries.  Indeed, it is no secret that trade unions 
in India remain thoroughly divided along political and ideological lines.  
Currently, there are thirteen Central Trade Union Organizations (CTUOs) 
recognized by the national government.  Most are affiliated with national or 
regional political parties, and tend to defend their parent parties’ programs and 
policies while opposing those of the opposition’s (see Table 1 for a complete list 
of India’s CTUOs and their party affiliations).  Unions have notoriously lacked 
autonomy, and probably the worst in this respect – as the Rudolphs (1987) 
repeatedly stress – is the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), the 
labour federation affiliated to the Congress Party.  INTUC protested neither the 
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Indira Gandhi government’s virulently anti-labour actions in the 1980s, nor the 
Narasimha Rao government’s neoliberal reform agenda in 1991.    
The easy subordination of labour by political parties is, no doubt, 
facilitated by the fact that Indian trade unions, despite their claims to the 
contrary, have traditionally spoken for a very narrow pool of workers.  Trade 
unions have focused, almost exclusively, on organizing workers in the formal or  
“organized sector.”  Since independence, employment in the organized sector 
has not exceeded more than eight percent of India’s workforce, and the available 
statistics suggest that this proportion is diminishing steadily (see IAMR, 2008, p. 
197; also see Table 5).  For unions, however, the decision to focus on workers in 
the organized sector is probably the most sensible strategy in the short run.  Such 
workers tend to be more educated, articulate, and more easily mobilized than are 
workers in the informal or “unorganized” sector (for the Government of India’s 
position on the distinction between organized and unorganized workers, see 
Table 5).  Notably, unions have heavily targeted white-collar workers in 
industries such as banking, engineering and insurance, as these tend to present a 
potent combination of a strong sense of entitlement and a fiery discontentment 
(stoked by comparisons of their wages and emoluments with those of private 
sector workers).   
In the long run, however, following this path of least resistance has meant 
that most trade unions have failed to expand their bases of support in any 
meaningful way.  Here, a couple of points are worthy of mention.  The reader 
will note that, according to Table 6, the number of registered trade unions has 
expanded quite significantly in the last thirty or so years (from 37, 539 in 1981 to 
68,544 in 2002).  Table 2 indicates, furthermore, that the CTUOs have more than 
doubled their memberships since 1980 (12.39 million in 1980 to 24.88 million in 
2002).  Taken together, these numbers suggest that Indian unions have been 
fairly successful in recruiting new members.  If one returns to Table 6, however, 
it is evident that the number of unions submitting returns (USRs), along with the 
average membership of USRs, has remained more or less the same.  Thus, the 
number of workers counted as members of USRs was about 5.4 million in 1981; a   
figure that shifted only marginally to about 6.9 million in 2002.  When seen as a 
proportion of the total work force, of course, this represents a substantial decline.   
My point about the USRs is significant because, in India, it is only the 
USRs that truly matter.  These are the unions that actually bother to file 
information about their membership numbers and finances with the 
government.  It is well-known that many “registered unions” are inactive, and 
even “ghost unions” (with no real members), which are set up by various party-
affiliated unions to artificially inflate their numbers.  Thus, in real terms, most 
unions have fared poorly in terms of recruiting new members, and this has led, 
quite predictably, to an erosion of their clout within their parent political parties.  
My interviews with senior party officials suggest that, in the eyes of many party 
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elites, labour’s potential for mobilizing votes has become less and less promising.  
Some officials I spoke with could not name a single leader associated with their 
“labour wings.”       
The scenario was quite different in the first few decades following 
independence. At this time, labour’s persistent disadvantage of fragmentation 
amid small numbers was compensated by its superior level of political 
organization relative to other social and economic actors.  It was also 
compensated – and ironically so – by labour’s clientelistic relationship with 
political parties.  Paternalism had its advantages, especially at a time when many 
among the political-bureaucratic elite valued employment and welfare above 
profitability, albeit within the bounds of capitalist development.  The 
relationship between the state and labour was highly unequal, but within the 
parameters of this asymmetrical relationship, public officials were willing to 
award labour a sympathetic hearing.  Labour was widely consulted, and 
functioned as a pressure group of some relevance inside the institutional 
framework of the state.   
With the onset of economic liberalization, however, growth and 
profitability were ranked more clearly above employment and welfare.  With 
unions and their politics regarded as an obvious nuisance, labour soon found 
itself stripped of the few, limited benefits of the state’s paternalism.  State 
governments were less willing to protect labour, and political parties, less 
responsive to the advice and reproach of their labour wings.  For example, in 
2001, a coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) developed 
proposals to radically amend the Industrial Disputes Act and the Contract 
Labour Act without any form of consultation with its affiliated labour 
organization, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS).  If anything, this was done 
over the BMS’s vehement objections (see Hindustan Times, 11 May, 2001).   
Labour’s political decline, however, owes to more than its own inability 
to organize effectively, or, for that matter, to only market reform.  It is also rooted 
in the rise to prominence of identity-based politics in India, a phenomenon that 
first took visible shape in the 1980s and 1990s.  One manifestation of this was the 
rapid ascent of lower caste parties and politics in the 1990s – indeed, according to 
one of India’s leading political scientists, Yogendra Yadav (2000), this signalled 
the country’s  “second democratic upsurge.”  Another manifestation was the 
intensification of the politics of religion, again mainly in the 1990s, which 
strengthened India’s ‘Hindutva’ movement and its associated political party, the 
BJP.4   
The emergence of the BJP as a major political actor in the late 1980s 
culminated in its electoral successes at both state and national (federal) levels (at 
the national level, the BJP was in power in an alliance with other parties from 
1998 to 2004).   As the BJP climbed from strength to strength through the 1990s, 
the membership of its affiliated trade union, the BMS, expanded rapidly.5  Even 
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now, when the BJP’s electoral fortunes appear to be in decline (the BJP was badly 
mauled in the 2009 national election), the BMS remains the largest trade union in 
India.  While the BMS does advocate broadly for “workers” – the phrase “workers 
unite the world” flashes across its website’s homepage –  the organization also 
stresses virtues such as “Hindu pride” and “Hindi (language) pride.”  The 
waving about of such majoritarian themes by the BMS has had a deeply divisive 
impact on the country’s tremendously diverse (multi-faith and multilingual) 
workforce.  In light of this, the rapid expansion of the BMS is best seen as having 
adversely affected the labour movement, since its style and idiom usually serve to 
undermine working class unity.   
Labour received another body blow in the 1990s with the rapid ascent of 
a spectrum of parties that spoke for the country’s “lower castes,” a category 
typically subdivided into (a) the “Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes” 
(widely regarded as among the most underprivileged in the country) and (b) the 
“Other Backward Classes” (OBC), a more nebulous grouping, whose precise 
composition is under continual contestation.  The latter category received a 
somewhat clearer, caste-based definition from a government-appointed 
commission in 1980, which recommended that 27 percent of central 
administration and public sector jobs be reserved for the OBC.  This was to be in 
addition to the constitutionally proposed quotas already in place for the SC/ST.  
After receiving only half-hearted consideration for years, these quotas, along 
with other affirmative action policies, were vigorously implemented in the 1990s, 
when parties representing both categories of lower castes captured power in 
state after state across North India.  As a result, the lower castes succeeded in 
penetrating a broad swathe of state institutions, and also gained tremendous 
sway over party politics. 
Labour unions have reacted in different ways to the rise of these identity 
politics based on religion and caste. The BMS has arguably been the sole 
beneficiary of the former.  In the meantime, the unions affiliated with the Left 
have distanced themselves from the Hindutva movement, as well as from the 
BMS.6  In relation to caste politics, it is evident that labour organizations in 
general, along with their affiliated political parties, do recognize that lower castes 
now comprise a formidable political force.  Entrenched national parties, such as 
the Congress and the BJP, have absorbed large numbers into their ranks (see 
Jaffrelot, 2002), and their respective unions (such as INTUC and BMS) have 
followed suit.  For the unions affiliated to India’s Communist parties, however, 
this process of change and adjustment has been particularly difficult, as they are 
typically opposed to identifying and/or recognizing workers as members of a 
particular religion or caste (favouring lower castes via quotas is, of course, 
premised on such practices of identification and recognition).7  All in all, the 
politicization of religion and caste has brought to the surface socio-cultural 
fractures of considerable depth and ugliness within the labour movement.  Caste 
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and religion are particularly potent at the plant-level, where charges of prejudice 
and discrimination among members can leave unions divided.  Identity politics 
have also strained relations between trade unions – such as between the Left-
affiliated unions and the BMS – making it difficult to organize broad-based 
labour fronts in opposition to neoliberal reform (more on this in the next section 
of this paper).      
Identity-based politics in India should not be viewed as an entirely 
negative development.  The rise of the lower castes is, without a doubt, a mark of 
progressive change; a refreshing departure from the elitism and upper-caste 
domination that have blighted Indian democracy.  Nonetheless, it has presented 
a thorny problem for labour.  The political ascent of the lower castes has only 
further drained away its already-limited potential for organizing the 
economically and socially disadvantaged.  It does not help that the lower castes 
have precipitated a shift in the language of the politics of justice from issues of 
class to issues of representation.   
Take the question of privatisation, for instance, which both the lower 
castes and labour have opposed, the lower castes, because only the public sector 
is legally bound to implement caste-based quotas, and labour, because it equates 
privatisation with layoffs and closures.  While these initial anxieties over the loss 
of jobs are similar, labour and lower-caste groups have articulated their 
opposition to privatisation in dissimilar ways.  While labour argues that 
privatisation will further enhance the power of capital, the lower castes say it 
will hinder their representation in government jobs.  It is evident that the lower 
castes’ argument is taken the more seriously, in fact, so much so, that the central 
government recently floated the idea of caste-based job quotas in the private 
sector as a means of countering lower-caste opposition to privatization, thus 
allowing the issue to move ahead.   
The recasting of opposition to liberalisation and the quest for social 
justice in the language of representation has stolen labour’s thunder, so to speak, 
depriving it of the leading role it might have otherwise obtained in the process of 
resisting neo-liberal reform.  It is interesting to note that none of the thirteen 
CTUOs recognized by the central government – a complete list is provided in 
Table 2 – is affiliated with an explicitly (and, as some would say, exclusively) 
pro-lower-caste party such as the BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party).   This is perhaps 
unsurprising, since all trade unions, whatever their political colour, are founded 
on the idea that the class cleavage in Indian society is the most salient one, 
whereas caste-based parties challenge precisely this point.8     
 
IV.  THE STEPS TO RENEWAL?  
 
The complex politics of decline has precipitated an urgent search by 
India’s labour unions – particularly those aligned with the Left – for a strategy 
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that will allow them to reposition and reassert themselves on the shifting sands 
of India’s economic and political terrain.     
To counter the problems of fragmentation due to the rise of religious and 
caste based politics, the multiplication of unions and a patently more hostile 
state, many unions, especially the left have formed cross-party alliances or 
“labour fronts” to protest the aggressive economic liberalization programs 
implemented by government after government.  Indeed, the leadership of the 
Communist Party of India Marxist (CPM) proposed and adopted such as 
strategy at its 17th  Party Congress (see Bandopadhaya, 2002).9  In an interview 
with the author, the Secretary for the CPM-affiliated Centre for Indian Trade 
Unions (CITU), Tapan Sen, pointed out that, since 1991, CITU had participated in 
(and in most cases initiated the organization of) twelve such national-level labour 
fronts and “general strikes.”10  The last general strike was held on August 20th, 
2008.   
Sen said that support for such labour fronts extended well beyond the 
unions associated with the Communist Left.  He further said that, while the two 
unions (INTUC and BMS) affiliated with the two big national parties in India 
(the Congress and the BJP) were not formally involved in the organization of 
nationwide general strikes, many workplace-level unions affiliated with the BMS 
and INTUC had supported the strikes nonetheless.  Sen, along with other union 
officials (who did not wish to be identified), suggested that more and more 
unions were finding themselves in the uncomfortable, and previously 
unthinkable, position of having to oppose their parent parties’ policies, and that 
this might be seen as an important shift integral to the post-1991 period.   
Caste politics, however, remain a major impediment in the organization 
of (these otherwise successful) Left-led labour fronts.  Lower-caste leaders appear 
to believe that the Communist parties’ longstanding preoccupation with the 
economic dimensions of the class struggle renders them incapable of fully 
appreciating the issue of caste oppression, and, by connection, also unequipped 
to address the lower castes’ specific economic interests.  The various Communist 
and Socialist parties have strived hard to improve their standing among lower 
caste groups: much of their new political work is concentrated in Scheduled 
Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities.   Nevertheless, feelings of distrust 
linger, and, in fact, are often mutual (see Bandopadhaya, 2002).  As a result, 
smaller (mainly informal sector) labour organizations with large numbers of 
lower-caste members have been reluctant to join labour fronts organized by the 
Left.  How such relationships will evolve in the future is an open question.     
Another strategy used by unions, chiefly to combat the effect of shrinking 
numbers, is to seek alliances with workers’ associations outside the formal or 
“organized” sector, as well as with student, environmental and other civil society 
groups.  As Table 3 suggests, all CTUOs now claim that workers in the 
unorganized sector comprise a significant proportion of their memberships.  The 
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main Communist trade unions, CITU and the All India Trade Union Congress 
(AITUC), tend to regard themselves as pioneers with respect to organizing 
workers in the unorganized sector.  Admittedly, the CITU-affiliated Bidi 
Workers and Packers Union in West Bengal is one of the better known and more 
vocal of the various unorganized sector workers’ unions in India (bidis are thin 
cigarillos produced mainly by women in their homes).  CITU has also emerged 
as an important force in the demand for a nationwide social security framework 
for unorganized sector workers in India.  Nonetheless, when one counts the 
number of unorganized sector workers organized by all the CTUOs in 2002 
(approximately 10.4 million, as reported in Table 4) as a percentage of the total 
number of unorganized workers across both organized and unorganized sectors 
(about 422.6 million in 2004-2005, as reported in Table 5), one is left with an 
underwhelming 2.4 percent.  Table 4 suggests, furthermore, that unionized 
unorganized sector workers are concentrated in the politically important 
“agricultural and rural” sector, even though some of the most egregiously 
exploited and vulnerable unorganized workers are in the urban informal sector, 
working as domestics, or in the food preparation industry, as waiters, busboys 
and so on.  It is evident, at any rate, that while the labour movement’s recent 
focus on unorganized sector workers is a mark of progressive change, and will 
likely lend it considerable strength in the long run, a great deal still remains to be 
done.     
Another perceptible shift is that unions are increasingly inclined to 
organize around welfare objectives, such as housing, healthcare, and sanitation, 
rather than around wages and job security alone.  This development owes partly 
to the rise of independent (politically unaffiliated) unions at the plant and shop-
floor levels, especially in the IT and BPO sectors, and partly to the attempt, by the 
established, party-affiliated unions, to network with existing unorganized 
workers’ associations (such as street vendors’ associations) and other civil society 
groups (such as women’s micro-credit groups), all of which tend to organize 
around micro-level welfare demands (on this, see Agarwala, 2007).  The 
proliferation of broad-based alliances with civil society actors will likely push 
labour organizations even further to mobilize, more frequently, around welfare 
demands pressed directly on the state than on wage-related demands pressed on 
managers and employers.   
Yet another perceptible trend, provoked by the attenuation of labour’s 
linkages with political parties and state institutions, as well by as the emergence 
of broad-based alliances and networks, is the growing inclination of labour 
organizations to rely on mass protest tactics, such as rallies, demonstrations, 
blockades, and sit-ins, rather than on strikes alone.  Trade unions are also now 
more likely than ever to pursue big, economy wide issues, such as privatization 
and trade liberalization, than purely sectoral or industry-specific concerns.  In 
her study of anti-privatization mobilization in India and Peru, for example, Uba 
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(2007) finds that Indian trade unions have significantly widened their repertoire 
of protest tactics, and have collaborated with various environmental, consumer 
and student groups in a range of anti-privatization calls to action.  Uba points 
out the declining incidence of strikes (see Table 3 for the official statistics) should 
not be taken to mean that Indian unions have become less politically engaged or 
proactive.  She sees unions as a keen participant in post-1991 protest action in the 
country (Uba’s period of study is 1991-2003; see Table 7 for a summary of her 
findings related to this issue).   
Ultimately, one might say that, given their growing emphasis on welfare-
oriented demands, economy wide issues and mass mobilization efforts, many 
trade unions in India have become indistinguishable from other popular actors, 
and at times, have fused into larger social movements.  For labour, these 
strategies of potential revival bear both advantages and costs.  Thanks to their 
relatively superior material resources and familiarity with the legal-institutional 
framework of the state, established party-affiliated unions may provide the more 
inchoate popular movements poised against neo-liberal reform with valuable 
advice, focus, strategy and even leadership.  These unions’ interactions with 
popular actors may also meaningfully transform their not altogether undeserved 
reputation of being ossified bastions of upper-caste, male privilege.  On the other 
hand, labour’s involvement with so many types of societal groups, and so many 
types of social and political struggles, may dissipate the energies and resources 
of individual unions, and even erode their numbers, as existing members may 
begin to feel that membership does not carry any special advantage.   
Labour’s immersion in wider social movement politics could also blunt a 
certain critical edge that labour still tends to bring to the agenda of progressive 
politics.  The country’s civil society groups – its thousands of NGOs and 
community-based organizations – often focus on forms of empowerment that are 
crucial, but nonetheless market-facilitating.   They typically call for the provision 
of health, education, roads and electricity for the poor, which are essential for 
human dignity, but also for market activity.  As a matter of fact, while the post-
liberalization state regularly fails to meet these demands, it is not entirely hostile 
towards their being raised, especially since such demands are rarely framed as 
entitlements.  Political-bureaucratic elites, along with the World Bank and other 
donors of foreign aid, generally concede that civil society groups should succeed 
in their goals, but argue that they cannot, due to “poor governance,” corruption, 
limited resources, or whatever else (problems that, incidentally, civil society 
groups are expected to solve for themselves).  If unions, particularly those on the 
Left, merge indistinguishably into popular movements, what might be lost is a 
more focused, class-based politics, that questions the persistent structural 
inequalities underlying problems such as limited resources and governance 
failure, and demands the redistribution of wealth from both the state and global 
actors.   
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For these reasons, unions do need to maintain their focus on issues 
directly related to labour and class, as polarizing as this may seem in the short-
run.  Their primary objective should be the inculcation of a new class 
consciousness founded on (yet not eclipsed by) the commitment to eradicate 
other forms of oppression based on caste, gender, race, and so on.  An excellent 
complement to a domestic strategy in this vein might be the forging of alliances 
with non-Indian and trans-national unions.  At the local-level, non-Indian unions 
are already proving their worth by intervening in labour disputes involving 
multinational corporations (MNC) head-quartered in their home country, and 
bringing public notice to the MNC’s labour practices in India.11  Indian unions 
can also work with unions and workers’ movements outside India to coordinate 
global-level protest action, and to push the envelope on the much-talked-about 
development of enforceable core labour standards.  Indeed, such trans-national 
or global linkages may assist Indian unions in highlighting, for a domestic 
audience, how forms of marginalization based on gender, race, and so on, tend to 
converge with class oppression, particularly in this new, more aggressive phase 
of globalization.  In an interview with the author, CITU President M.K. Pandhe 
pointed out that many American and Canadian unions CITU has formed 
relationships with represent large numbers of immigrant and/or migrant 
workers, significant proportions of whom are women.  Such collaborations drive 
home the point, he said, of the need for “unity against global capital.”12 
 
V.  CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
 
In this paper, I have analyzed the place and role of organized labour in 
India in the era of economic liberalization.  Adopting a historical-structuralist 
view of the emergence of organized labour in India, I have focused on how 
different political actors involved in the struggle against British colonial rule 
developed their labour strategies, and why these strategies eventually translated 
into tight affiliations between labour unions and political parties in the post-
colonial context.  Additionally, I have examined some of the consequences of 
such tight party-union affiliations, suggesting that while the reach of capital has 
become increasingly global, labour’s ambit is too often constrained to the local, 
with unions locked in narrow conflicts along party lines.  I have also suggested 
that the explosion of identity-based politics in recent years, the consequence of 
several decades of democratic expansion, has further fragmented India’s labour 
movement, complicating the process of alliance-building (both nationally and 
globally) that many unions have deemed a necessary response to the neoliberal 
state’s increasingly brazen attacks on organized labour.   
My paper has claimed that complex and demanding though it is, it is 
evident that many labour organizations in India are engaged in some sort of 
process of revitalization, and are altering their mobilizational and organizational 
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strategies accordingly.  Ultimately, however, the results, repercussions, or even 
the true extent, of these difficult politics of revival are not yet fully known.  My 
paper simply attempts to signal that they are, in fact, occurring. Studying the 
impact and implications of labour’s ongoing politics of revival – especially the 
response to these politics from the grassroots – could prove to be a promising 
area of new research.       
 
Table 1 
Ranking of Indian Central Trade Union Organizations on the Basis of Their Membership, 
as of 31st December, 2002 
 
 





















3 AITUC  
(All India Trade 
Union Congress) 
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of India (CPI) 
 
3.44 13.83 






5 CITU  
(Centre for Indian 
Trade Unions) 
Communist Party 
of India Marxist 
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0.73 2.94 




Unaffiliated 0.69 2.77 
9 AICCTU  
(All India Central 
Council of Trade 
Unions) 
Communist Party 
of India Marxist 
Leninist (CPI-ML) 
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Federation) Kazagham (DMK) 
 







12.  NFITU (DHN)  
(National Front of 
Indian Trade 
Unions Dhanbad) 
Unaffiliated 0.57 2.29 
13 NFITU-KOL  
(National Front of 
Indian Trade 
Unions Kolkata) 
Unaffiliated 0.03 0.14 
TOTAL   
 
24.88 100.00 
Sources: Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India (as cited in Datt, 2008, 
p. 995). 
Table 2 
Membership of Selected Central Trade Unions, 1980 and 2002 (in Millions) 
 
Union 1980 2002 
INTUC  3.51 3.95 
BMS  1.88 6.22 
UTUC LS 1.23 0.84 
HMS  1.84 3.34 
TUCC  0.27 0.73 
AITUC  1.06 3.44 
CITU  1.03 2.68 
All trade unions 12.39 24.88 
Source: Verification of Membership of Central Trade Unions,  
Government of India, Ministry  of Labour, 2002 (as cited in Das, 2008, 
 p. 971).     
 
Table 3 
Industrial Disputes: Strikes Vs. Lockouts 
 
Year Strikes Lockouts 
1965 1697 (92.48) 138 (7.52) 
1970 2598 (89.3) 291 (10.07) 
1975 1644 (84.61) 299 (15.39) 
1980 2501 (87.57) 355 (12.45) 
1985 1355 (77.21) 400 (22.79) 
1990 1459 (79.95) 366 (20.05) 
1995 732 (68.67) 334 (31.33) 
2000 426 (55.25) 345 (44.75) 
2005 227 (49.78) 229 (50.21) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are per cent of the  
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total number of industrial disputes for that year. 
Source: Compiled from different issues of  
Indian Labour Statistics, Ministry of  
Labour, Government of India, and Economic  




Membership of Major Central Trade Unions in India, 2002 (in ‘000) 
 
  Unorganized Sector  
Trade Union Organized sector Non-agriculture Agriculture Total 
BMS 
 
2842 (46) 2037 (33) 1336 (21) 6216 
INTUC 
 
2337 (59) 672 (17) 945 (24) 3954 
CITU 
 
946 (35) 1622 (61) 111 (4) 2678 
AITUC 
 
894 (35) 1078 (31) 1470 (43) 3442 
HMS 
 
1816 (26) 866 (26) 656 (20) 3338 
UTUC (LS) 
 
324 (54) 303 (22) 746 (54) 1373 
Others 
 
712 (24) 789 (20) 2381 (61) 3883 
Total  
 
9872 (18) 7368 (30) 7645 (31) 24855 
Note: Figures in parentheses are per cent of total membership 
Source: Verification of Membership of Central Trade Unions, Government of India, Ministry of Labour (as cited 
in Das, 2008, p. 972). 
 
Table 5 
Trade Union Membership of  Selected Unorganized Sector Workers (USW) 
 
Sectors # of USW who are  
CTUO members 
% of total  
CTUO membership 
Agriculture & Rural Sectors 7,645,086 30.7 
Building & Construction 1,070,278 4.3 
Brick Kiln 457,718 1.8 
Personal Services 446,748 1.8 
Other 769,767 3.0 
Total  
USW members of the CTUOs 
10,389,597 41.7 
Total membership of all CTUOs 24,884,802 100.0 
Source: Compiled from data presented in Table 3, Datt, 2008, p. 995.  
 
 




Employment in the Organized and Unorganized Sectors (in Millions) 
 






Informal/ Unorganized  
Sector 
341.3 (99.6%) 1.4 (0.4%) 342.6 (100%) 
Formal/ Organized  
Sector 
20.5 (37.8%) 33.7 (62.2%) 54.1 (100%) 
TOTAL 361.7 (91.2%) 35.0 (8.8%) 396.8 (100%) 
2004-2005 
Informal/ Unorganized  
Sector 
393.5 (99.6%) 1.4 (0.4%) 394.9 (100%) 
Formal/Organized  
Sector 
29.1 (46.6%) 33.4 (53.4%) 62.6 (100%) 
TOTAL 422.6 (92.4%) 34.9 (7.6%) 457.5 (100%) 
Source: Report on Conditions of Work and Promotion of Livelihoods in the Unorganized Sector (New Delhi: 
Government of India, National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector, 2007), p. 4.  According 
to this report (p.2), which reflects the prevailing understanding on the subject, the “unorganized sector consists 
of all unincorporated private enterprises owned by individuals or households engaged in the sale and 
production of goods and services operated on a proprietary or partnership basis, and with less than ten total 
workers.” In contrast, “unorganized workers consist of those working in unorganized enterprises or households, 
excluding regular workers with social benefits, and the workers in the formal/organized sector without any 
employment/social security benefits provided by employers” (emphasis mine).    
 
Table 7 
Number of Registered Trade Unions and Their Membership 
 






1961 11,312 6,813 589 
1971 22,484 9,029 606 
1981 37,539` 6,682 808 
1985 45,067 7,815 823 
1990 52,016 8,828 795 
1994 56,872 6,277 652 
1998 61,992 7,403 979 
2000 66,056 7,253 747 
2002 68,544 7,812 893 
Source: India Yearbook 2008 – Manpower Profile (New Delhi: Institute of Applied Manpower  
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Table 8 




Number of  
actions 




Blocking roads, occupying buildings 6 450 1.00 
Demonstrations, marches and rallies  54 4,669 1.00 
Strikes, slow downs  91 161,385 2.68 
Sit-ins 17 35,646 1.13 
General nation-wide protests 32 768,256 1.08 
Other  26 11,980 1.27 
Source: Uba, 2007, p. 59.   
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1.  Terms such as “paradigm change” or “paradigm shift” are frequently used to capture the scale of the 
changes represented by the economic reforms introduced in 1991.  See, for example, the World Bank, 
1996, pp. xvii, 31.  
2. The essay is a revised and abridged version of a conference-paper prepared for the 50th annual 
meeting of the Indian Society for Labour Economics (ISLE), held in Lucknow, India, in December 
2008.  Though increasingly dominated by mainstream economists, ISLE conferences are guaranteed a 
strong showing from India’s Marxist academe, as well from Left-allied scholars outside the country.  
The mix is always colourful and productive, and this essay owes a debt to the insight and reflections 
of the many, varied contributions at the Lucknow summit.   
3. Indeed, this was the consensus among the scholars that participated in the 50th annual meeting of the 
Indian Society for Labour Economics (ISLE), held in Lucknow, India, in December 2008.   
4. ‘Hindutva’ is the idea and argument – now in circulation for about a century – that India should be 
governed by Hindu principles, or that India, like Pakistan, should be a state founded on the religion 
of the majority of its population.  The Hindutva movement’s position on the status of religious 
minorities in India tends to be fiercely assimilationist, i.e., that they should integrate into the 
dominant ‘Hindu culture’ or simply leave.  Because of its longstanding association with the Hindutva 
movement, the BJP is often referred to as ‘Hindu Nationalist’ or ‘Hindu Fundamentalist.’  
5. The BJP, a cadre-based party, is renowned for its organizational skills at the grassroots level.   
6. In an interview with the author (New Delhi, 27th August, 2008), M.K. Pandhe, President of the Centre 
for Indian Trade Unions (CITU), the trade union federation affiliated to the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist), described the BMS as a “destructive force in the trade union movement” due to its 
“communal politics” and insufficient support for Muslim workers.   
7. The constitution of the CITU (affiliated to the Communist Party of India, Marxist) states that its fights 
“for the abolition of discrimination based on caste, like untouchability, on sex, and religion, in 
relation to employment, wages and promotion,” while the AITUC (affiliated to the Communist Party 
of India) lists among its aims, “to abolish political and economic advantage based on caste, creed, 
community, race or religion; to fight against all forms of social oppression and injustice.”  See CPI (M) 
web site,  http://www.citucentre.org/index.php  and CPI website, http://aituc.org/  
8.  Of course, the rise of identity politics and the problems these create for labour are not unique to the 
Indian story.  Politics around religion and ethnicity have also had a deleterious impact on labour 
movements in the advanced capitalist countries, where it is all too common for employers to exploit 
socio-cultural cleavages among workers.   
9. The CPM has governed the state of West Bengal since 1977 as part of the ‘Left Front’ (an alliance of 
Left parties led by the CPM). CPM-led Left Fronts have also formed the government numerous times 
in the states of Kerala and Tripura.      
10. Sen was interviewed on February 17th, 2009, in New Delhi.  
11. In my interviews with CITU officials I learned that a South Korean union had proved most helpful in 
supporting striking workers at Hyundai Motors plant in Chennai in 2007.  They appealed to Korean 
lawmakers and public policy officials on behalf of the Indian workers, and also took the story to the 
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(Korean) press.  Soon after, Hyundai’s Chennai managers relented to a number of the key demands 
advanced by their workers.  
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